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AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROVISIONS 
AND STANDARDS OF THE FCPA 
Frederick B. Wade* 
As I was reflecting on what I should say here this morning, I 
took into account what was said last night, particularly the sug-
gestion that we should reflect on the process and consider what in-
sights our experience with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act1 
(FCP A) can give us into the policymaking process. There are a 
number of points I would like to make in this regard. First is the 
extent to which it is possible to reconcile the need, indeed the de-
sirability, of having a statute that is predictable and certain in its 
application, with the need for standards of law that will adequate-
ly cover a variety of disparate situations without loopholes that 
would frustrate achievement of the statutory purpose. Other ques-
tions involve the extent to which the policymaking process is cap-
able of coming to grips with situations where it is difficult to de-
termine what is actually going on in the business community, what 
impact the statute has had since its enactment, and how it may be 
possible to alleviate the concerns expressed by critics of the law 
with respect to the application and interpretation of the Act in a 
way that is consistent with the policies of the Act, if indeed we 
want to preserve those policies. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Let me begin by putting the statute in perspective. Accord-
ing to the House Report2 concerning the Act, more than 400 corpo-
rations admitted making questionable or illegal corporate pay-
ments by October of 1977. These companies included some of the 
largest and most widely held public companies in the United 
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1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff) (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I, infra. 
2. H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 4121. 
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States. The total amount of payments disclosed was in excess of 
$300 million, much of it in payments to foreign government of-
ficials, politicians and political parties.3 
The legislative history reflects a number of different reasons 
for enactment of the antibribery provisions of the Act. As Wally 
Timmeny pointed out last night, a large factor, perhaps the pri-
mary factor, was the impact that these payments had in terms of 
the foreign relations of the United States. The disclosures of 
payments by Lockheed in Japan shook the government of that na-
tion to its foundations. 4 In Italy, payments to government officials 
eroded public support for the government and jeopardized our 
foreign policy in that area.5 The Congress was particularly con-
cerned about the fact that, since Italy was a member of the NA TO 
treaty alliance, the possibility existed that a government could 
come to power which could give representatives of the communist 
party access to NA TO secrets. It was felt that this possibility had 
profound implications, not only for our foreign policy generally, 
but for defense policy as well. 
The Congress also pointed to the adverse impact that bribery 
could have upon American business. The Senate and House re-
ports point out that bribery could seriously injure the long-range 
interests of American business by affecting the stability of over-
seas sales. In addition, the committee reports indicate that bribery 
is destructive of a basic tenet of the free-market system, namely, 
the principle that competition for sales should take place on the 
basis of price, quality and service, and should not be skewed by 
the payment of bribes. They also point out that the disclosure of 
such payments can damage a company's image, lead to costly law-
suits, cause the cancellation of contracts, and result in the expropri-
ation of overseas assets. Moreover, to the extent that these types 
of costs might result, there may be disclosure questions · raised 
under the securities laws. 
These are the policy considerations the Congress relied upon 
3. Id. 
4. Japanese Premier Kakui Tanaka resigned in 1974, following accusations that he 
had accepted $1.7 million in bribes from Lockheed Corporation. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1974, 
at 3, col. 5. 
5. Italian President Giovanni Leone resigned on June 15, 1978, after accusations of 
tax evasion and kickbacks including a $2 million Lockheed bribe. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1978, 
at 1, col. 3. Lockheed signed a consent agreement with the SEC , promising not to make such 
payments in the future . SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCR) , 95,509 (D.D.C. 1976). 
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in adopting the FCP A. These are the reasons why there was a 
great deal of momentum behind the movement to deal with the 
problems associated with bribery of foreign officials. The Con-
gress enacted a statute that was intended to eliminate or 
eradicate such bribery. 
II. CORPORATE RESPONSE 
This is where my thoughts about the nature of the process 
first come into play. In retrospect, the business community has 
had a great deal of difficulty with the Act. But at the time the 
legislation was being considered in the Congress, and hearings 
were being held, there was a great reluctance on the part of inter-
ested companies and persons to come forward and make their 
views known. Although this reluctance may be understandable, 
given the subject matter, there was virtually no opposition to the 
bill. Few, if any, concerns were expressed in a public forum as to 
how the FCP A might affect overseas operations or how the 
statute might be interpreted and applied. 
There was a hearing in June of 1979 before a subcommittee 
chaired by former Congressman Eckhart of Texas, who was one of 
the principal sponsors of the FCP A. He commented during the 
course of that hearing about the lack of concern raised about the 
Act at the time it was under consideration. Moreover, there is still 
great difficulty in getting the corporate sector to come forward 
and express concerns in a public forum in a way that the Congress 
can get a handle on them and try to deal with them in a rational 
way. 
The public record, as it existed at the time the statute was en-
acted, does not reflect the kinds of concerns that have been raised 
since the FCP A became law. For example, it is said that the FCP A 
has caused American companies to lose a substantial amount of 
business. However, to the extent that there is legislative history 
bearing on this subject, persons testified that bribery was un-
necessary in order to conduct business overseas. In addition, it 
was suggested that a prohibition of bribery might benefit 
American companies by giving them a basis to refuse attempted 
shakedowns by foreign officials, or by eliminating unfair competi-
tion by American competitors. In some cases, bribes were paid by 
American companies not to obtain business that might otherwise 
have gone to foreign concerns, but to divert business from other 
American companies. 
3
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The situation is rather complicated. How do you grapple with 
this kind of situation, and make a determination as to where the 
national interest lies? How do you assess the need for a statute of 
this kind in the first instance, and then evaluate the impact that it 
has had since enactment? This is particularly difficult when you 
have a situation, due to the nature of the subject, where the peo-
ple most affected do not feel free to come forward and to lay out 
their concerns. 
Much of the criticism levied against the Act comes down to a 
call for greater predictability and certainty with respect to the in-
terpretation and application of the statute. There are allegations 
that the statute is ambiguous and unclear as to what one has to do 
to comply. But it is difficult to get a handle on the impact that the 
statute has had, because most of the experience people have had is 
related to the government or to the Congress in the form of 
anonymous anecdotes. People say we have had this type of ex-
perience, or this kind of problem, but you have to take our word 
for it, accept our general description of the circumstances, and 
agree not to identify the source of the information. As a result, 
there is no way to look at the circumstances involved and verify 
the accuracy of the information received. Nor is it possible to 
evaluate the anecdotes to see if a claim of lost business results 
from ambiguity in the statute or from a perception that the 
business could not be obtained without engaging in conduct that 
the Congress clearly intended to prohibit. 
People may say that they are unsure as to what they can do 
with respect to overseas business, but if you look at the cir-
cumstances presented, the difficulty with the FCP A is not very 
often ambiguity or a lack of clarity. Instead, business may be lost 
because it would require the kind of conduct that Congress clearly 
intended to proscribe. 
I am not suggesting that there is no room for improvement. 
We all agree that statutes should be clearly written so that there 
will be predictability and certainty. However, I am attempting to 
illustrate that, from the perspective of the policymaking process, 
it is very difficult to sort out the concerns expressed about the 
FCP A, to evaluate the anecdotal information that is presented, 
and to determine what ought to be done. 
A. The GAO Report 
The only empirical study that has been done to date is the 
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report by the Controller General on the Impact of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act on U.S. Business.6 The findings are in-
teresting, although I am not sure how much weight they should be 
given in light of the nature of the survey and the types of 
responses elicited. 
The GAO report surveyed 250 American businesses and cor-
porations. It does not necessarily reflect hard data because many 
questions merely asked respondents for opinions as to the impact 
of the Act. 
The GAO report reflects that 76.5 percent of the respondents 
stated that the Act has, or probably has, been effective in reduc-
ing questionable corporate payments abroad. Only five percent 
asserted that the Act has not, or probably has not, been effective 
in that respect. These figures indicate that the Act has had a 
tremendous impact in the way that business has been conducted 
abroad. 
Much of the impact occurs in meetings between private 
counsel and the companies that they advise. Those who engage in 
advising companies how to comply with the statute will confirm 
that this statute has had a tremendous impact. 
Perhaps another indication that the statute has been effective 
in achieving its intended purpose is the fact that, since the enact-
ment of the statute in 1977, the Commission has brought only two 
cases enforcing the antibribery provisions. I do not think this low 
number reflects a lack of commitment to enforcement. We are 
committed to strong enforcement of the FCPA. However, we have 
to take cases as they come. The Justice Department, which shares 
responsibility for enforcement of the FCP A with the Commission, 
has brought only two civil cases and one criminal case under the 
Act. If you compare the large number of cases prosecuted prior to 
the FCP A, with the small number of cases prosecuted since enact-
ment, the figures appear to confirm the finding that there has 
been a tremendous change in the way overseas business is con-
ducted. 
There are a number of inferences which could be drawn from 
this. It is clear, however, we have not had that many enforcement 
cases involving bribery of foreign officials since the statute was 
enacted. 
The GAO report also took note of the widespread assertions 
6. U.S. GAO, IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S . BUSINESS (1981) 
[hereinafter referred to as "the GAO report"]. 
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that bribery provisions have caused American companies to lose 
business. As I have indicated, these claims were not supported by 
hard, verifiable data. But GAO's survey data indicates that the 
problem of lost business that is attributable to ambiguity may be 
much less than many have assumed or asserted. 
Of the respondents, nearly sixty-eight percent reported that 
the bribery prohibitions had little or no effect on their business. If 
you include those reporting what the GAO classified as a marginal 
decrease in business, you find that 87.5 percent of the companies 
responding to the survey either experienced no loss in business or 
only a minor decrease. Twelve percent of the respondents re-
ported a decrease of business that could be characterized as mod-
erate. Less than one percent indicated they had suffered a great 
decrease. 
As I said earlier, I do not know how much weight one can give 
to these statistics. I am not inclined to give them a great deal of 
emphasis, but this is the only empirical data available with respect 
to the impact that the statute has had. 
With respect to claims of a lack of clarity and ambiguity in 
the statute, the survey data provides another interesting insight. 
A total of 79.5 percent of the respondents indicated that the clari-
ty of the bribery provisions was either adequate or more than ade-
quate. Only 8.8 percent expressed the view that the clarity of the 
provisions was either inadequate or very inadequate. 
B. General Criticisms of the Act 
Let me return to the essential questions I raised at the 
outset. How do you assess where the national interest lies? How 
do you make a reasoned judgment as to what is the appropriate 
policy for the United States? 
I attended a conference at the Smithsonian Institute which 
was attended by a representative of a developing nation in Africa. 
The principal criticism of the FCP A asserted at the conference 
was the notion that the antibribery provisions of the statute were 
little more than an effort to export American notions of morality. 
Critics suggested that the United States was acting like a "Boy Scout in 
seeking to proscribe bribery." The African representative responded 
with the observation that people around the world, including those of 
his own country, are very sensitive about the corruption of their public 
officials. Although bribery may be common in some areas of the 
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world, he pointed out that bribery is universally condemned in law and 
policy. He believed it is in the long-range interests of the United 
States to eliminate bribery of foreign officials by American cor-
porations because this will prevent an adverse public reaction in 
those countries if such payments should be made and subsequent-
ly disclosed. 
Should the policy of the United States be one of attempting to 
eradicate bribery of foreign officials on the part of American cor-
porations? Or does one take the position that it is simply 
unrealistic to try to conduct business without bribery in an im-
perfect world and that, under these circumstances, the nation has 
to accept the risks - and the potential costs - such a policy may 
have in terms of the long-range interests of the nation and of 
American corporations. 
Although the debate is often couched in terms of "exportation 
of morality," I believe a good case can be made that the Congress, 
in enacting the statute in 1977, made a very pragmatic judgment 
in assessing these policy considerations. It is an oversimplification 
to characterize the FCP A as merely an effort to export morality. 
This leads me to an observation about the quality of the 
public debate going on for four years since the statute was 
enacted. From my perspective, the critics of the FCP A and those 
in government charged with administering the Act have been talk-
ing past each other for four years. I am not sure why this is true. I 
am sure that there has been a failure to communicate and that we 
have not advanced the ball to a great degree in terms of coming to 
grips with the issues. This failure to communicate has profound 
implications with respect to the ability of the policymaking pro-
cess to evaluate the issues and make needed changes in the law. 
I have already discussed one aspect of the problem. Many 
have claimed, or assumed, that the antibribery provisions of the 
FCPA have caused American companies to lose a substantial 
amount of business. However, there has been a failure to com-
municate the kind of information needed to assess the extent of 
such losses, identify reasons for such losses and determine 
whether there are changes that could alleviate the problems en-
countered in a manner consistent with the polices of the Act. I say 
"consistent with the policies of the Act" because most critics state 
that their problem lies not with the policy of the Act, but with a 
lack of clarity and ambiguity in the terms used to express that 
policy. 
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IIL ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS 
Another example which illustrates the failure to communicate 
that has characterized the debate on the FCP A involves the ac-
counting provisions of the Act. The debate with respect to this 
aspect of the FCPA was initiated with the publication of the so-
called "ABA Guide."7 
The ABA Guide suggested, among other things, that the ac-
counting provisions of the statute should be limited by a materiali-
ty standard. The materiality standard is a standard of limitation 
applicable to the disclosure requirements of the federal securities 
laws. In general, the materiality standard limits liability for a false 
or misleading statement in a required report to the Commission, 
or misleading or false statements which would be "material" to a 
reasonable investor. In other words, the statement must be false 
or misleading in a manner that a reasonable investor would con-
sider important in making a decision to buy, sell or hold securities, 
or to exercise voting rights on matters put before the share-
holders. 
The ABA Guide took the position, particularly with reference 
to the record-keeping requirement, that there had to be some 
limitation on liability. The record-keeping provision requires that 
issuers, generally referred to as "reporting companies," subject to 
the Securities Exchange Act,8 shall "make and keep books, records 
and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly 
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
issuer." The statutory command is clear and straightforward. 
Companies should have accurate books and records. 
The difficulty with this proposition lies in the fact that in a 
company of any size, it is virtually impossible to maintain books 
and records that are entirely accurate. There are always going to 
be errors and inadvertant mistakes. As a result, even with the 
standard of reason incorporated in the "reasonable detail" 
language of the statute, every company subject to the Act would 
likely be in technical violation of the statute. 
A. The Materiality Standard 
How do you deal with that problem? The ABA Guide said, 
7. ABA Comm. on Corp. Law and Accounting, Sec. of Corp., Banking and Business 
Law, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAW 307 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as the "ABA Guide"]. 
8. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
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let's have a materiality standard. But materiality is defined in 
terms of what a reasonable investor would consider important, or 
"material," to the financial statements of an issuer. For a company 
of any size, this means that you would need transactions of 
thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, 
before the record-keeping requirement would be applicable. 
Transactions of a lesser amount- not "material" to the financial 
statements - would not be subject to the requirement that they be 
recorded accurately. 
Understand what is happening here. The Securities Exchange 
Act9 is a statute which traditionally has regulated disclosure on 
the part of reporting companies. All of a sudden, you have a new 
statute which requires companies to have accurate books and 
records. The new law has nothing to do with the output of the ac-
counting system, which is reflected in the financial statements and 
other disclosure documents. It is a statutory requirement that 
regulates the input that goes into the accounting system. It 
regulates how individual transactions must be recorded, as 
distinguished from how financial information based upon the ag-
gregate results of all transactions must be disclosed to investors. 
How should a transaction be recorded? Section 320.38 of 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 indicates that transac-
tions should be recorded at the amounts in which they occur, in 
the periods in which they occur, and be classified in appropriate 
accounts. That is what an auditor expects to find when he audits a 
company's books. However, if you use a materiality standard to 
determine what goes into your accounting system -to define the 
transactions a company is required to record accurately- few, if 
any, transactions would be subject to the record-keeping re-
quirements. From that perspective, the argument set forth in the 
ABA Guide simply does not make sense. But we've been talking. 
about the "materiality" issue for four years. 
When members of the Commission staff speak in a forum such 
as this, we are asked, "Is there, or should there ·be, a materiality 
standard?" Members of the Commission staff say, "No. There is no 
basis for such a view in either the language of the statute or in the 
legislative history. Moreover, it would not make sense to have 
such a standard." 
Such statements by Commission staff members have been 
misunderstood and misinterpreted as assertions that the Commis-
9. Id. 
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sion intends to sue every company that has an inadvertent or 
minor deficiency in its record-keeping system. There is a percep-
tion that, if a company has an error in the five or ten dollar ex-
pense account voucher, the Commission may bring an enforcement 
action. Frankly, we have much more important things to do. 
Nevertheless, the fear was there. The concern was real, and the 
perception of the problem was real. And, as a result, the debate 
continues. 
B. Pending Legislation 
When hearings were held on the Chafee Bill, 10 which would 
amend the statute, the proponents of the Bill were still arguing 
that a materiality standard should be applied to the record-
keeping requirement, despite the fact that a standard stated in 
terms of a financial statement materiality simply would not work 
in the context of a record-keeping requirement. Representatives 
of the business community urged that a materiality standard be 
adopted to limit liability for violations of the record-keeping re-
quirement. There were a number of efforts made to develop a 
definition of "materiality" that various segments, among the in-
terested parties, could agree upon. However, interested parties 
could not agree upon a definition of "materiality" that was 
workable. The upshot of the process was S. 708 which, as passed 
by the Senate, has no books and records requirement. 
Senate Bill 708 would retain the internal accounting controls 
provision, requiring companies to devise and maintain systems of 
internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurances that certain statutory objectives are met. These objec-
tives include the recording of transactions as necessary to prepare 
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles, and to maintain accountability for assets. 
However, the specific requirement that each transaction be re-
corded accurately and fairly has been deleted from the Bill. 
The words of the record-keeping requirement are still there, 
but they have been moved into the internal accounting controls 
provision. This approach emphasizes that accuracy in record-
10. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. 13,983-85 (1981); Business Accounting 
and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearings on S. 708 Before the Subcomm. on 
Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). These proposed 
changes to the FCPA are reprinted in Appendix II, infra. 
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keeping is still an objective to be achieved, but also makes clear 
that liability will not always result if a company fails to make and 
keep records that are accurate in every respect. 
I think the Bill, as passed by the Senate, is an improvement. 
It does clarify a number of areas of difficulty. However, that result 
was delayed by the failure of interested parties to come to grips 
with the problem, define the relevant issues and come up with 
solutions that are workable. 
There is a related issue that I want to discuss. That is the 
need to reconcile the goals of predictability and certainty, on one 
hand, with the need for statutory standards that are capable of 
covering a broad range of conduct. 
When I was in law school, my first course was torts. For the 
first two to three weeks of the class, the professor began each 
class by asking, "What is negligence?" A number of people would 
take a cut at trying to define the term, but he would never tell us 
that answer. He just kept asking the question. The ultimate 
answer, and the point of the exercise, was the fact that there is no 
answer. The answer depends on the circumstances of each and 
every case. 
I think we have a similar problem here. The accounting provi-
sions and the antibribery provisions of the FCP A established stan-
dards of conduct that can only be understood in terms of the 
specific facts of each and every case. This fact is perceived by 
those who have to advise companies how to comply, as well as 
those who are subject to the Act, as a problem that needs to be 
solved. On the other hand, it is not a very unique situation. An-
other example of a legal standard that depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case is the materiality standard. The mater-
iality standard requires what the Supreme Court has referred to 
as "a delicate assessment" of the relevant facts and circumstances 
to determine whether a reasonable investor would have con-
sidered a particular fact so significant that it would alter the total 
mix of facts bearing upon a particular investment decision. 10a 
I submit that the application of the materiality standard to 
particular cases is not different from the situation we have with 
the legal standards incorporated in the FCP A. Yet we do not see 
the same kind of concerns and fears expressed about the materiali-
ty standard, which potentially has much broader application to 
corporations and may involve greater potential liabilities. In con-
lOa. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). 
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trast, there is a great deal of concern expressed with respect to 
the standards set forth in the antibribery and accounting provi-
sions of the FCP A. 
Perhaps the difference results from the fact that the 
materiality standard has been in the law for about fifty years and 
people are familiar with it. The term has been construed by the 
courts and you can read cases explaining what the courts have 
said. In contrast, there have been no litigated or adjudicated cases 
under the FCPA. From an analytical perspective, you have the 
same kind of problem. The legal standard generally describes 
what the statute requires or proscribes, but its application 
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. This means 
that the judgments as to potential liability necessarily have to be 
made in the light of hindsight. 
Consider the standards contained in the accounting provi-
sions of the FCPA. Reasonable detail in record-keeping is equated 
in the legislative history with the recording of transactions in ac-
cordance with accepted methods of recording economic events. 
Frankly, no one knows precisely what that means. The accounting 
profession does not know, I do not know precisely what that 
means. I think it means that if you have a problem as to what de-
gree of detail is "reasonable," you should consider whether that 
degree of detail i.s consistent with generally accepted practices 
and methods of recording economic events. Frankly, I do not think 
there is much doubt among accountants as to how transactions 
ought to be recorded. 
The reasonable assurances standard contained in the internal 
accounting controls provision also depends on the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. It requires management to make judg-
ments as to the adequacy of its internal accounting control 
systems in terms of the relative costs and benefits involved. In 
fact, to the extent that it explicitly incorporates the concept of a 
cost-benefit analysis, this provision may be unique among 
regulatory statutes. 
The reasonable assurances standard is intended to make 
clear, among other things, that that statute requires only cost ef-
fective measures to be taken. As a result, all improvements to an 
internal accounting control system made in response to the 
statute should, theoretically, be cost beneficial to the company. 
Yet the principal criticism of the provision involves assertions 
that there have been excess costs of compliance. The GAO report 
is probably the best evidence for the criticism. 
12
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IV. ANT/BRIBERY PROVISIONS 
Turning to the antibribery provisions, we have the "corrupt-
ly" and "reason to know" standards. I suggest that these two stan-
dards are also fact specific. Their applicability depends on the cir-
cumstances of each case. 
How do you deal with this problem of reconciling the need for 
predictability and certainty with the countervailing need to have a 
statutory standard that will cover a broad range of circumstances 
without loopholes for evasion? Let me leave you with some 
thoughts expressed by former Commissioner Stephen J. Friedman 
about a year ago in the context of the accounting provisions. I 
think it may also provide an insight into the questions which have 
been raised about the antibribery provisions. 
The common thread running through responsible criticism 
of the Act's accounting provisions is their lack · of precisions. 
Truly, they are fairly general statements. There are no safe har-
bors or precise guidelines. I submit, however, that this generali-
ty is not the Act's weakness, but its strength-in the cir-
cumstances the only practicable means of achieving its goals. 
Today there are over 9,000 public companies subject to the 
Act. They range from firms with assets of approximately $1 
million to behemoths with billions of dollars in assets. Each is dif-
ferent. Yet the Act must apply to them all-with as much 
fairness and equity as we can muster. In my view, fixing precise 
guidelines applicable to all issuers with equal force would put 
these companies into strait jackets without any hope of realizing 
the Act's goals. It would, in fact, do precisely what the Act's 
critics fear: put the SEC directly into the business of setting ac-
counting principles and practices.11 
Many have requested that the Commission provide guidance 
as to how to comply with the accounting provisions of the Act. I 
think that this could lead to the result Mr. Friedman predicted. If 
we respond in the way requested, the Commission would now be 
in the business of prescribing accounting standards. 
The Commission has resisted the notion it should tell com-
panies what accounting methods they should employ, what are ac-
cepted methods of recording economic events, and what con-
11. "The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," remarks to 
the University of Kentucky Distinguished Speaker Series, Lexington, Kentucky, Feb. 25, 
1981. 
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stitutes reasonable assurances. These are judgments that should 
be made by the private sector .12 
Let me return now to the antibribery provisions. How do you 
define standards of conduct in this area that are flexible enough to 
cover a broad range of conduct and, at the same time, provide the 
kind of predictability and certainty in administration and applica-
tion so that persons can comply? 
The antibribery provisions of the Act are divided into two 
parts. One part is administered by the Commission. It gives the 
Commission civil enforcement authority with respect to "report-
ing companies." The Justice Department has criminal enforcement 
responsibility with respect to that provision. There is also a 
separate provision applicable to "domestic concerns," which in-
cludes corporations, partnerships, and individuals. The Justice 
Department has both criminal and civil enforcement respon-
sibilities with respect to "domestic concerns." Substantively, the 
two provisions are virtually identical. Accordingly, I will not 
distinguish between them during my remaining remarks. 
The antibribery provisions make it unlawful for any reporting 
company or domestic concern, or any officer, director, employee, 
or any agent or shareholder acting on behalf of a company, or do-
mestic concern, to make use of the mails or any instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, in furtherance of any offer, payment, or pro-
mise to pay, any money, gift, or thing of value, to foreign officials 
and certain other persons for a corrupt purpose. Classes of recip-
ients covered by the prohibition include an official of a foreign 
government, a foreign political party, an official of such a party, a 
candidate for foreign political office, or any other person who 
knows, or has reason to know, that all or a portion of such money, 
or a thing of value, will be offered, given or paid, directly or in-
directly, to any of the foregoing persons. 
A. The "Corruptly" Standard 
The prohibition applies to payments that are made for a cor-
rupt purpose; i.e., the purpose of influencing an act or decision of a 
foreign official, foreign political party or candidate for foreign 
political office, or inducing such a person to use his or its influence 
12. The SEC has announced that, as a matter of policy, it does not intend to render in-
terpretative advice. Exchange Act Release No. 34-14478, reprinted in FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) , 72,264 (Feb. 16, 1978). 
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to affect any government act or decision, in order to assist any 
issuer in obtaining, retaining or directing business to any person. 
The word "corruptly" is ·used in order to make clear, according to 
the House Report 13 concerning the FCPA, that the offer, payment, 
promise, or gift must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse 
his official position, for example, wrongfully to direct business to 
the payer or his client. The House Report also makes clear that 
the word "corruptly" denotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent 
wrongfully to influence the recipient. The "corruptly" standard 
does not require either that the proscribed act be fully consum-
mated or that it succeed in producing the desired outcome. 
The "corruptly" standard has been a source of concern. The 
principal area of concern has been what constitutes evidence of a 
corrupt or evil intent. For example, questions are raised as to 
what extent it may be permissible to provide entertainment or 
gifts to foreign officials in connection with efforts to sell goods, or 
the extent to which one may incur costs for inviting foreign of-
ficials to the United States in connection with sales demonstra-
tions or presentations. As I indicated earlier, the determination of 
what may be "corrupt" necessarily involves a review of the facts 
and circumstances of each case. 
People engaged in overseas business don't find this a terribly 
satisfying response. Nevertheless, there is a serious question as to 
what the alternative would be if you did not have such a standard 
to distinguish between what is, and is not, permissible. 
The Chafee Bill, 14 as it passed the Senate, would retain the 
"corruptly" standard. However, it would add a series of excep-
tions to the coverage of the antibribery provisions. 
It may be useful to review some of the exceptions contained 
in S. 708. Ask yourselves, as I read them to you, "Will the new 
language provide certainty and predictability? Will it provide a 
more adequate guide to corporations and others subject to the 
statute with respect to what they should or should not do? To 
what extent will we have advanced the ball if we end up with a 
formulation along these lines?" 
The Bill would exclude any payment, gift, offer or promise of 
anything of value to a foreign official which is lawful under the 
laws and regulations of the foreign official's country. I suppose 
13. H.R. REP. No. 831, supra note 2. 
14. S. 708 supra note 10. 
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this reflects the notion that there may be countries in which such 
payments would be permissible. However, it is my understanding 
that virtually every country in the world prohibits bribery of their 
officials. 
What effects would such an exclusion have? On one hand, it 
would cause the government some difficulty in proving a case 
because prosecutors would have to look to the substantive content 
of the laws of other nations. But from the perspective of a com-
pany, the corporate managers and company counsel would also 
have to look to the substance of the laws of other nations, and 
there may be substantial difficulties in construing the provisions 
of foreign law. 
Another exception would apply to any payment, gift, offer or 
promise of anything of value which constitutes a courtesy, a token 
of regard or esteem, or a return for hospitality. It is clear what the 
thrust of this exception is. It would make clear that payments or 
gifts which are no more than a mere courtesy, a token of regard or 
a return for hospitability would not be considered corrupt. But 
what do these terms mean? What conduct is included or excluded? 
Another exception refers to any expenditures, including 
travel and lodging expenses, associated with the selling or pur-
chasing of goods or services, or with the demonstration or ex-
planation of products. This is another very broad exception. The 
general thrust is clear. But what will the exception mean when ap-
plied in particular sets of facts and circumstances? 
A fourth exception would exclude ordinary expenditures, in-
cluding travel and lodging expenses, associated with the perfor-
mance of a contract. Again, there is a question as to what this 
would mean. 
In my view, these exceptions reflect an attempt to define the 
scope of the term "corruptly," but while the general thrust is 
clearly to remove certain types of conduct from the ambit of the 
term "corruptly," the application of the exclusions to concrete 
facts may be difficult. Under the existing "corruptly" standard, 
one must look to the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether a payment or gift is "corrupt," or was made with the re-
quisite intent. In performing such an analysis, there are a number 
of factors to be considered, such as the amount of the payment in-
volved, the person to whom it was given, and the purpose for 
which it was paid. Was it really something that should be viewed 
in the nature of a courtesy rather than an attempt to influence 
someone to misuse his official position? 
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B. The "Reason to Know" Standard 
The "reason to know" standard, which is applicable to agents, 
is a provision that is designed to pick up situations in which 
agents are used to channel payoffs to foreign officials. If you do 
not have some way of dealing with the problem of payments made 
through intermediaries, it would not be possible to have a statute 
that would effectively accomplish the goal of eradicating corporate 
bribery. On the other hand, it is very difficult to precisely define 
what can and cannot be done. I think that is one reason the Con-
gress determined to utilize the "reason to know" standard. Con-
gress, in effect, left it to the corporate community, the courts, and 
the Commission to decide whether there is "reason to know" on 
the basis of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. 
When you are engaged in a legislative process, or any other 
kind of negotiating process, there are always differences of views. 
One way to resolve them is to raise the level of abstraction. If the 
level is high enough, it's easier to find principles upon which an 
agreement can be based. 
Moreover, the "reason to know" standard is not that unusual 
in the law. According to one commentator, it appears in twenty-
nine provisions of federal criminal and civil statutes. According to 
the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts, the definition 
of "reason to know" may be summarized as "an awareness of a 
substantial probability ."15 
What does this mean in practice? Companies have been ad-
monished by their counsel and others to look at various factors as 
possible red flags or indices that "reason to know" may exist. One 
is the question of where the business is to be conducted. Some 
have suggested that merely because a company does business in a 
particular country, it will be presumed to have "reason to know." I 
think that is a mischaracterization of how the standard works. 
However, it reflects the type of concerns that have been raised, 
the kind of perceptions that we are dealing with, and the type of 
understanding that exists as to what this provision means. 
Another factor is the reputation of an agent. Some agents 
have notorious reputations. Accordingly, inquiries have been 
made as to the reputation of an agent and the way in which the 
agent has conducted business in the past. This kind of inquiry ob-
viously imposes cost burdens on companies in connection with the 
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 12 (1965). 
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inquiry and consultations with counsel. The results are not always 
terribly satisfactory. What do you do if an agent refuses to make a 
representation that he would not pass money or gifts on to a 
foreign official? Another factor is the amount of commission or 
payment that may be involved. These are the kinds of inquiries 
which companies have been making. 
A large part of the difficulty with the "reason to know" stan-
dard results from the fact that, after the inquiry is made, there is 
not always that clear-cut basis for making a business decision. On 
the other hand, it may be very clear that there are problems. 
In this respect, the Chafee Bill would alter the reason to know 
standard. The Bill would make it unlawful to make use of the 
mails, or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, 
corruptly to direct or authorize, expressly or by a course of con-
duct, a third party to act in furtherance of a payment, gift, offer or 
promise of anything of value to a foreign official for a prohibited 
purpose. A new "course of conduct" standard would replace the 
"reason to know" standard. 
This seems to be another fact specific standard. You still have 
to look to the facts and circumstances of each case to determine 
whether a "course of conduct" falls within the proscription or does 
not. 
V. CON CL US/ON 
In conclusion, we have been grappling with these issues for a 
number of years. There are serious concerns that have been ex-
pressed by the business community and others. The Congress is in 
the midst of an effort to try to provide greater predictability, 
clarity and certainty. However, as I reflect upon the way the pro-
cess has worked to date, and the need to reconcile the goals of 
predictability and certainty with legal standards that will ac-
complish the statutory purpose, I am not confident that we will be 
able to provide a greater degree of predictability, certainty, and 
clarity-which everyone agrees is a desirable objective. 
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